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Abstract—Networking is undergoing a transformation
throughout our industry. The need for scalable network control
and automation shifts the focus from hardware driven products
with ad hoc control to Software Defined Networks. This process
is now well underway. In this paper, we adopt the perspective
of the Promise Theory to examine the current and future states
of networking technologies. The goal is to see beyond specific
technologies, topologies and approaches and define principles.
Promise Theorys bottom-up modeling has been applied to server
management for many years and lends itself to principles of
self-healing, scalability and robustness.
I. INTRODUCTION
As networks grow in scale and complexity, some argue
for a return to centralized and imperative management [1].
Network design revolves around legacy data structures and
protocols rather than the business functionality required from
the network. A modern approach to network design emphasiz-
ing simplicity and relevant abstraction seems overdue. Such
an approach could reduce the cost and brittleness of network
design.
The ‘Promise Theory’, was introduced in 2005 as a way
to model distributed systems with complete decentralization
[2]. Coupled with abstraction, it offers a looking glass onto
the design and management of networks. If we define what a
user or application needs from the network we can begin to
get away from imperatively controlling the ‘how’ the network
functions and instead focus on declaratively describing ”what”
is required from it. In Promise Theory, network elements act
as autonomous agents and collaborate to find the best way to
deliver the required function.
In this paper we apply Promise Theory as a measuring stick
for the current state of networking to cast a critical eye over
current practice and future directions. We show that there are
simple unifying principles for networking that are independent
of scaling arguments, and that there is no need to base future
networking on centralized control.
II. PROMISE THEORY
Promise theory is about what can happen in a collection
of components that work together [2], [3]. It is not a network
protocol, but a descriptive algebra. One begins with the idea
of completely autonomous agents that interact through the
promises they make to one another. It is well-suited to model-
ing networks [4]. Although we cannot force autonomous agents
to work together, we can observe when there are sufficient
promises made to conclude that they are indeed cooperating
voluntarily. Our challenge in this paper, is to translate this
bottom-up view into top-down, human managed requirements.
Agent is the term used for the fundamental entities in
Promise Theory. Agents are not necessarily like ‘software
agents’, they can be any active entities like an interface that
keeps promises. Actions taken by agents are not in the scope of
Promise Theory. We assume that appropriate actions are taken
to keep the promises. In that way, we focus on declarative
intent, rather than imperative procedures.
A. Formalism
The promise formalism has a number of features, described
in [5]. We refer readers to this reference for details.
A promise is an intention that has been ‘voluntarily’
adopted by an agent (usually channeling a human owner,
or perhaps an agreed standardization). An agent that only
promises to do as it’s told is dependent or voluntarily sub-
ordinated. It has some of the characteristics of a service: an
agent makes its intended behavior known to other agents (e.g.
I will serve files on demand, or forward packets when I receive
them). An imposition is an attempt to induce the cooperation
of another agent by imposing upon it (e.g. give me the file,
take this packet).
We write a promise from Promiser to Promisee, with body
b as follows:
Promiser
b−−→ Promisee.
and we denote an imposition by
Imposer
b
Imposee.
Promises and impositions fall into two polarities, denoted by
±. A promise to give or provide a behavior b is denoted by
a body +b; a promise to accept something is denoted −b (or
sometimes U(b), meaning use-b). Similarly, an imposition on
an agent to give something would have body +b, while an
imposition to accept something has a body −b.
Although promises are not a network protocol, agents can
exchange data. To complete any kind of exchange, we need a
match an imposition (+) with a promise to use (-). To form a
binding (as part of a contract), we need to match a promise
to give (+) with a promise to use (-). This rule forces one to
document necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperative
behaviour.
A promise model thus consists of a graph of nodes
(agents), and edges (either promises or impositions) used to
communicate intentions. Whatever protocol might be used
to communicate promises is not defined (and shouldn’t be).
Agents publish their intentions and other agents may or may
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not choose to pay attention. In that sense, it forms a chemistry
of intent [6], with no particular manifesto, other than to
decompose systems into the set of necessary and sufficient
promises to model intended behavior.
III. NETWORKING FROM A PROMISE PERSPECTIVE
A. Ethernet (L2)
The agents that keep promises to send and receive data are
the network interfaces. For example, in the Ethernet protocol,
interfaces Ei promise to label transmissions with a unique
MAC addresses or string of digits.
Ei
+MACi|MACi 6=MACj−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Ej ∀i, j
When data are transmitted by an interface, the interface keeps
its promises to use messages that have (destination MAC
address, data). Note: the message is not a promise, the promise
governs how the message is handled.
Ei
(+MACj ,+data)
Ej
Messages are sent ‘fire and forget’ as impositions on to a
remote receiver. While all interfaces generally promise to
accept any MAC address, (unless they block with MAC access
control) only the interface whose MAC address matches the
destination in the message doublet actually promises to accept
the message voluntarily. Note, there is nothing other than
convention to prevent all agents from accepting the data too;
this ‘promiscuous mode’ is used for network monitoring, for
example.
E∗
−MACj−−−−−→ Ei ∀i, j
Ei
(−MACj ,−data) if (i=j)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Ej
Since the channel is unprotected, agents effectively promise
the data to all others in scope. Moreover, all agents promise
to decode the address and the data, but many will discard the
results.
While this set of promises is scale independent, the as-
sumption that every agent has to be in scope of every transmis-
sion does not scale, since it requires messages to be flooded or
broadcast to every node (agent), in principle. The primary issue
with raw Ethernet is that there are no ways to selectively limit
the size of these broadcast domains. This makes the ‘everyone
please take a look at this’ approach impractical.
Fig. 1: An Ethernet switching function.
In Fig. 1 we see two interfaces that promise MAC address
00:00:11:11:11:AA (shortened to AA) and 00:00:11:11:11:BB
(shortened to BB). Suppose we wish to send data from AA
to BB, then, since the Ethernet is a push-based imposition
protocol, only half a contract is needed for emergent delivery,
and we leave the rest to trust.
EAA
+MACBB
Eswitch
Eswitch
−MACi−−−−−→ Ei ∀i
Eswitch
+forward MAC BB−−−−−−−−−−−−→ EBB
In each point-to-point interaction, the agent has to formally
promise to use (-) the delivery service promised by the agent
giving (+). This is the algebra of binding. There is no notion
of a permanent virtual circuit, as say in ATM. However, if
we add handshaking, a similar story can be told about ATM,
Frame Relay, MPLS and other systems.
B. Internet Protocol (L3)
IP provides Wide Area Networking by issuing two part
addressing to cope with transmission scalability. IP addresses
still promise to be globally unique, but are interpreted as
doublets.
(network prefix, local address)
Only addresses with the same prefix are considered in mutual
scope for broadcasting, and messages addressed from one
prefix to another promise to be forwarded deliberately rather
than by ‘flooding’. IP is thus a cooperative effort that builds
on promises rather than impositions alone.
To make this work, IP needs two kinds of agent, which
fall into different promise roles (see figure 2): interfaces
(terminating connections), which only transmit and receive
data intended for them, and forwarders (called routers or
switches) that cooperate with multiple interfaces, and promise
to selectively forward data from one interface to another
between protected broadcast domain. This acts as a flood-
barrier or firewall to packets promised to different prefixed
networks.
To model routers, without giving up the interface abstrac-
tion, we introduce the concept of a route service (or link
service), whose job it is to establish cooperative forwarding
between the interfaces.
Interface
Interface
Interface
InterfaceInterface
Router
128.39.78.128.39.78. 4
prefix local
1 177.16.1.1
src dest?
Fig. 2: Internet promises. An end-node or leaf and its single interface
promises to relay through a ‘router’ which is surrounded by multiple
interfaces, thus connecting multiple network branches.
Consider Fig. 2. The source node has an address, normally
written 128.39.78.4/24. As a doublet, the promises see it in
two parts as i = (prefix=128.39.78, local=4). We’ll call this
the source prefix, or, j = (prefix=128.39.78, local=1) for the
router interface. When a message is sent to an address with a
different destination prefix, data are sent by imposition to the
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interface on the router with the source network prefix (usually
the ‘default route’):
Isourcei
+(destination,local),+data
Irouterj
Each router interface j promises the connected source inter-
faces i to use all such packets, a priori, and to present them
to the router (kernel) which keeps the following promises.
Irouterj
−(∗,∗),−data−−−−−−−−→ Isourcei
Irouterj
+prefix,+data−−−−−−−−−→ Router
Similarly, other interfaces connected to the router’s interfaces
promise to accept messages from the router that have their
prefix:
Isourcei
−(prefix,source),+data−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Routerj
Crucially for messages to escape from a local region, the router
promises all IP interfaces to forward messages it receives on
one if its own interfaces according to a set of promises which
we denote ‘forward’. The router interfaces, in turn, bind to this
promise by accepting it.
Router
+forward−−−−−−→ Irouterj
Irouterj
−forward−−−−−−→ Router
The forward promise has the following logic:
(1) If the prefix of the destination interface is the same
as the prefix of one of the router’s interfaces, forward the
message onto that interface.
The remainder of the promise requires configuration with
knowledge of the wider world.
(2) If the prefix of the destination interface is known
to an internal database of external knowledge, i.e. the
Routing Information Base (RIB), forward the message to
the interface known to lead to the desired destination.
(3) Send all other message destinations to a pre-
decided default interface, where we expect to reach some
other router with greater knowledge of how to find the
prefixed network.
Note that, like the Ethernet, this algorithm has only emer-
gent behaviour that matches its design goal. It cannot, by direct
imposition, assure a successful delivery of messages, because
that requires the cooperation of potentially many intermediate
interfaces and routing agents. In spite of this apparent lack of
control, the Internet works demonstrably well. Trust plays a
major role in operations.
C. VLAN: L2 channel containment
The concept of doublet addressing in IP enabled improved
scalability, by black-boxing local networks, but added the cost
of routing. How expensive routing is, in relative terms, is a
constantly changing overhead that depends on many current
technological factors. Fear of this cost tends to make datacenter
traffic favor L2 solutions.
Routers were optimized for WAN delivery, so the obvious
question for LAN managers was: could routing be simplified
for smaller local regions without the paraphernalia needed for
global routing?
When packets don’t have to be routed through multiple
hops, i.e. when parts (2) and (3) of the forwarding promise
can be ignored, a simpler form of prefixing can be used. This
is the concept of the VLAN overlay. Interfaces can simply be
classified, or tagged with short integer labels:
(prefix, local address) → (VLAN-id, MAC-address)
Then we have multiplet address components again (but now
with a short VLAN tag instead of a large integer prefix), for
boxing off local regions. A VLAN tag signifies membership
in a private logical container. As with Frame Relay, these tags
have to be configured manually, so routing is a human-centric
process.
The concept of a Level 2 overlay has become quite popular
for its perceived simplicity in small isolated networks. It’s limi-
tations have to do with scaling of the manual configuration and
broadcast domains. VLAN is a brute force routing mechanism
that scales linearly with the number of addresses in a container.
Containers are not localized in physical space, only in logical
channel space (unlike the assumed distribution of prefixes in
IP). Thus this does not address the issues of physical scaling.
However, we need something that scales like logN or better
(like IP). We return to this in section VI-C.
D. Tunnelling addresses and transducer pattern
Embedding protocols inside one another is not the only
approach to containment. One can also strip off and repackage
data on different legs of a journey. To do this, one makes a
transducer that converts one kind of addressing into another
(see [5]).
ARP is one such service that maps between Ethernet MAC
addresses and IP addresses. Instead of a physical forwarding
table, a logical rewriting table is maintained. When a direct
ARP conversion is not possible, data are sent to the default
route, which is the address of the router interface Iprefix to the
default interface. DNS is another transducer, that maps from
symbolic addresses to IP addresses.
The same principle has been applied to isolated networks,
such as the reserved namespaces 10.0.0.0 and the example.com
addresses 192.1.168.0/24. IP Network Address Translation
(NAT) is now been promoted from crude workaround to viable
technology, extending the local IP addressing component with
additional internal addressing numbers, the rewriting outgoing
addresses to point to the standard IP address range. End to
end addressability is not normally promised in this scheme
however, so it has limited value, (however see TRIAD [7]) for
a viable scheme for extending IPv4 in this manner.
More recently, a tunnelling approach is also being used
to artificially extend Layer 2 VLAN as a stop-gap measure
for a technology users who are familiar with VLAN. VxLAN,
and NVGRE are encapsulations of Ethernet L2 Frames, with
tunnelling over IP to enable the physical reach across multiple
gateways. Addresses add a multiplet component: a Tenant
Network Identifier (TNI) or Virtual Tunnel End Point (VTEP)
identifier embedded parallel channels.
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These schemes perform two functions: i) they increase the
number of possible VLAN-like channel addresses, patching a
limitation in the VLAN implementation, and ii) they allow
teleportation of broadcast domains across an IP scale network,
transparently of routing concerns. Thus they do not eliminate
the cost of IP routing, but offer a comfortable user interface
for local network administrators.
IV. PROMISE PRINCIPLES FOR SCALABLE NETWORKING
Let us consider the principles that summarize the work
in the previous sections. We see two main issues: container-
specific addressing, and interface to interface forwarding.
Multiplet addresses allow the containment of broadcasts as
well as selective routing of traffic by ‘prefix’.
A. Addressability with scope or namespaces
By introducing multiplet addressing, we draw a logical (and
perhaps physical) container around a network region which
hides its internals with some kind of identifier or prefix, which
acts as a namespace identifier. Everything inside the namespace
is local and protected. There are two principles that explain
these cases.
Principle 1: Container multiplet addressing: Any
system that promises to support n-tuple addressability of
parts, for n > 1, enables logical or physical containment
of information, as well as log-scalable routability between
the containers. 4
To transmit data across multiple (possibly embedded) con-
tainers, we typically need an address component for each
logical container. Thus interfaces ai must promise to recognize
one of the components ai and pass on all others as passenger
data:
Interfacei
±(a1,a2,ai,...,an),±data−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Router
e.g. the ai address components might include MAC address, IP
address, VLAN number and VxLAN IDs. This set of addresses
need to be configured and managed, either manually or by
some mapping service. Some of these addresses overlap (like
IP-LAN and MAC addresses).
Principle 2: Forwarding by multiplet address: For-
warding of multiplet addressed data requires an infras-
tructure of forwarding promises by each members of each
container for each address component in which all other
components are ignored by other containers as payload
data. 4
An interfaces ai in a given container of level i would
promise to accept other components addresses components
as data only to be forwarded, not interpreted, i.e. as payload
with no assumed semantics. In practice some of the address
components might be removed or even rewritten, depending on
the encoding as data traverse container boundaries, but that is
not a requirement of the principle. All of the components have
a continuing logical existence. It would be enough to ignore
them. Note also that intrusion detection/prevention systems
sometimes break the semantics of ignoring payload.
B. Addressable scalability
The scaling of multiplet addressing is a straightforward
idea. It prevents a local namespace from becoming too large
for flooding or broadcasting. The size of the namespace is
limited either by a fixed number of nodes accessible in one
multiplet address (e.g. VLAN tag, OSPF areas, BGP AS, etc),
or equivalently, by the size of a prefix in a binary encoding of
the multiplet (as in IP). In the first case, there is no defined
limit to how many MAC addresses can occupy the same
VLAN. Scaling is throttled by physical limitations. In the latter
case there is an explicit quota tradeoff between local and global
from a fixed number of addresses.
If an n bit address has a prefix of length p, this improves
scaling through black-boxification of local regions. It trans-
forms the addressing of N = 2n things into the addressing
of merely NC = 2p, things globally and nC = 2(n−p) things
inside each of the C containers. That is lognC rather than nC
scaling.
There is also no particular reason why IP addressing has to
be limited to prefix quotas. IP Network Address Translation
is an attempt to extend the range of local addressing, inde-
pendently of the prefix quota space to alleviate IPv4 address
depletion.
C. Addressable multi-tenancy
As a side-effect of supporting logical or physical contain-
ment one obtains the ability to support multi-tenancy. This can
also be considered a mode of scaling in which one assigns
containers to distinct organizational owners. This requires
a mapping service (like an ARP table for organizations).
Registration of tenants is a manual human process. Presently
there is IANA as a global directory service, ISPs for address
delegation, and the Internet Exchanges for registering tenancy
promises.
D. Two distinct network services
Networking supports two main use-cases:
• Content delivery or pull requesting (asynchronous retrieval
promises of the form Node X−→ Node).
• Signalling or push notification (synchronous impositions of
the form Node
X
Node).
The former is a many-to-one association, for which we can em-
ploy versioning, replication (data-model de-normalization), re-
direction, and delocalization (e.g. Content Delivery Networks).
Point to point addressing is less important; caching is highly
meaningful. The concept of Name Based Routing has been
proposed to abstract away endpoint addresses [8].
For the signalling, we still need endpoint-resolution ad-
dressability, as signals cannot be cached, though they might
need to be flooded. Service delivery generally involved a
mixture of these two cases, which depends on the nature of
the application being supported. Applications typically want to
make certain promises about connectivity, security, e.g. load
balancing and firewall filtering options
Application-oriented delivery suggests other forms of con-
tainment based on the logic of the service interaction. Current
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networking management abstractions make application specific
requirements painful to configure because of lack of a consis-
tent model for abstracting them. This brings us to the present
day.
V. GENERALIZING NETWORK CONTAINERS
Given that the principle of containment is so flexible and
important for scoping data communications, it is natural to
ask whether there are other more relevant abstractions that
better support the needs of users. Several authors have opted
to rethink network architecture [8], [9]. We consider this from
a promise theory perspective.
A. Software Defined Networking
Software defined networking (SDN) is an umbrella term
for a programmatic approach to managing network devices,
using software controls to replace manual configuration [10].
It is considered more wide-ranging than the NETCONF or
SNMP device management protocols of the past. SDN includes
concepts related to network virtualization through overlays,
network function virtualization (NFV), virtualized L4/7 ser-
vice insertion and control, management and orchestration of
physical and virtual networking devices and functions (such
as switches, routers), as well as control systems relying on
specific control protocols like OpenFlow and OVSDB.
SDN is an interface transducer that essentially virtualizes
existing concepts such as virtual end-points (computers), vir-
tual cables (L1), virtual switches (L2), etc. Initial motivations
for SDN were to overcome the brittleness and the lack of
programmability, manageability and agility in networks. The
inability to treat network infrastructure uniformly gave birth to
the network virtualization through overlays, where underlying
physical underlays are abstracted away in a way that provides
perceived uniformity to the application/tenant traffic.
With abstractions rooted in past technology choices, de-
signed for the pleasure of network engineers rather than
application designers, a cultural gap has been exposed be-
tween the needs of application programmers, writing increas-
ingly distributed software. The current networking model re-
quires decomposition into primitives like L2 networks (VLAN,
VXLAN), tenant L3 domains (VRF) and multiple rules ex-
pressed as Access Control Lists (ACLs), or, in case of pure
OpenFlow-based SDN, a set of flow rules.
Application architects think about application components
and component interactivity; they rarely think about networks,
firewalls and other L4-7 services. Instead, they think about
services providing functions to other services, while consuming
functions of the infrastructure and other application compo-
nents/services.
With the emphasis on programmability of legacy technol-
ogy, the business purpose of an application can quickly be lost
in low level details. This makes application design and updates
a painful process.
B. Application-Oriented Network Promises
Another approach is to rethink the way architects reason
about interaction with the network altogether. Application-
centric group-based policies could be used for consistent en-
forcement of service requirements. Such ‘requirements’ (impo-
sitions) can also be turned around as promises, specified by the
application architect. This makes a concise self-documentation
of purpose, so it also has positive semantic value.
Promise Theory provides a theoretical framework for such
policy abstractions too, and so can be instrumental in solving
a larger problem: how to build a scalable, self-stabilizing
network, supporting any kind of abstraction.
There is no particular reason why the container principle
cannot be applied to other logical elements than channels
and network boundaries. A piece of software can also be
viewed as a local network that connects to a wider area.
Application architects need to think of network behaviors as
application components (the application services) and manage
their interactivity. Application architects can then focus on
understanding what functions a given service provides and
relies on through exposed interfaces.
Such an application service might be thought of as a cell
or logical network container, encapsulating a number of ap-
plication servers that provide the service contained within. All
server end-points within a service promise a set of functions
to the consumers of the service. The collection of such (+)
promises can be thought of as the basis for a contract by
which others interact with this service. In a cell analogy, this
could be called the cell membrane. The cell membrane protects
and regulates the conversations in and out of the cell. The (-)
promises that listen for client impositions could be thought of
as ‘receptors’ that identify what services can be talked about
and how.
Consider a classical three-tier application made from cells
(promise agents clusters):
• WEB - Web services.
• APP - Application services (e.g. Tomcat or jboss)
• DB - database services.
The tiers have internal structure, but insofar as we only
interact with their promises, we don’t care what it is. Each
tier comprises multiple computational end-points or service
‘hosts’. A host or end-point might be a Virtual Machine (VMs),
a container (like LxC or Solaris Zones) or simply a bare-metal
compute instance with a network connection. Since all hosts
within a tier provide identical function within the application,
they form a ‘promise role’ group that makes identical security,
forwarding and QoS promises. Membership of these end-points
within a group/role can be either administratively or automat-
ically established, most commonly based on the properties of
the compute element (e.g. virtual machine attributes).
The infrastructure promises made between these tier-agents
have to be established. To avoid the kind of manual setup
problems of ATM, VLAN, CLI, etc, the end-user’s needs
are communicated by some kind of signalling impositions
(API calls), e.g. ‘I need the db to talk to the app and the
firewall needs to be opened, I want sufficient channel capacity
(“bandwidth”) to be promised’. As long as the service accepts
such impositions from clients, it would try to promise what
was required. Only the service has the necessary knowledge
about whether such a promise is plausible however, so the
decision belongs inside as an autonomous decision.
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Each tier is really a collaborative group of agents that not
only promises to provide and use services between one another,
but which internally promises to collaborate uniformly to stay
coordinated.
Guest
Guest
Guest
Router
Policy−based
Guest
Guest
Guest
Host
Policy Source
G
G
1
2
G3
Host 1R R2H1
Containers in containers
Fig. 3: Host containers promise to forward communications between
guests and ‘outside’ as ‘routers’. Two levels of container means
agents need to maintain triplet addresses (Guest, Host, Outside). All
controllers are embedded in the containers.
The challenge of this abstraction is: how do we create a
unified user experience around this for application engineers?
Users need to comprehend a design composed of an increasing
number of logical entities and layers, arising from cross-cutting
abstractions. We believe the answer here lies in the managing
patterns of promises, which can also be described in terms
of the container principle. The challenge for technologists is
to avoid the temptation to push complexity back onto users.
Hopefully one can avoid referring to the OSI layer technologies
altogether and move towards a description based on Service
Level Agreements (SLA). Current SDN makes this accessible
but not natural. The key would seem to be some kind of
promise compiler.
C. End-to-end service promises via proxy
To see how this could be done, we return to promise theory.
The ‘proxy’ or intermediate agent pattern was described in
[5] abstracts the end-to-end delivery promise of a service S
through some promise to handle the delivery details by proxy
P to a client. Both client and server may be guests running
inside various containers.
The abstraction we would like to expose to the user is
for logical services and consumers to simply make promises
directly to one another (Fig.4), without worrying about all the
intermediate agents in between. The proxy pattern shows how
this can be achieved. We refer readers to [5] (section 11.3) for
a discussion.
Examples of the service S could be: to provide connectivity
over a secure channel, to grant or deny access to data, to
commit to or retrieve from storage, to provide web transport. It
is important to note that a go-between might create a superficial
similarity of function, but it also adds four promises and hence
four possible points of failure to the equation.
In terms of the cell membrane analogy described above,
we would say that the outer-membrane promises identify
how others can communicate to that service, what they can
communicate about, and what happens to the traffic when
they communicate. Today, one would have to separate it into
VLANS, Firewall rules, Load-Balancing rules etc. These are
Guest
Policy−based
Proxy
Guest
Virtual
Actual
Fig. 4: A generic proxy model that promises to mediate communi-
cation, with no internal details exposed..
details we would prefer to leave to a proxy on imposing on it
a minimum of application specific requirements.
By providing this as a service, one is able to reason about
applications, and how they interact with other applications
rather than with the physical underlay. The membrane thus
provides a level of abstraction that hides the details of the cell
composition. This is how the Insieme architecture works.
By isolating promises as containers that promise to play
certain roles in an application design, one can think about the
datacenter as an organism. Then an organism comprises of
many boxes containing multiple functions that manage their
own resources based on a policy declaration.
D. Policy-based containment
Putting the pieces together, what one ends up with from
a promise perspective is a set of logical containers that keep
user-friendly promises and conceal engineering details. This is
not an imposition control system, but rather a scaled design
that compiles into continuously enforcable local low-level
configuration promises. Based on net-wide coordinated policy,
one compiles high level promises into a kind of assembler code
for low level network configurations supporting a business
purpose.
VI. FITNESS FOR PURPOSE
We have shown how to represent both low and high
level intentions in terms of promises made by autonomous
entities (agents) in IT networks. We have also indicated how
a distributed application can itself be viewed as a service-
oriented network built from autonomous components. The
container principle serves both to abstract and limit the effect
of irrelevant load on inappropriate parts of such collectives.
Containers, not merely as abstract layers, but as namespace
boundaries for autonomous agents to work in, are clearly a key
abstraction for scalable service-oriented data communications.
The next obvious question to ask is: is a set of network
containers fit for purpose? How indeed might we align an
abstracted networked system with a given business purpose?
A container (a promise super-agent) can be identified by
the pattern of promises that are made to other agents beyond
its ‘border’ or ‘membrane’. This promise pattern becomes
associated with the role of the container [5], just as any
namespace label can act as a role identifier. Containers that
play similar roles make functionally equivalent promises.
Promise Theory answers the question of alignment simply
in terms of these outward intentions. Suppose we can compile
our desires for an application or goal into a number of promises
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with bodies d1, d2, d3 . . . that would need to be kept. Then, if
our network actually makes promises:
ApplicationNetwork
b1,b2,b3...−−−−−−→ Users
Then we can say, straightforwardly, that the network is aligned
with the purpose if
d1∪d2∪d3 . . . = b1∪b2∪b3 . . .
The outward promises form the user interface to the contain-
ers. Clearly application oriented containers are more directly
business-purpose friendly than OSI-layer containers for L2 or
L3 abstractions. But there is more to business purpose than just
functionality. Other systemic promises need to be considered
too when discussing fitness for purpose. Will the network
architecture scale? Will it fail gracefully under pressure? Will it
respond to our needs? Many of these answers follow from the
graph-theoretic properties of the promise graph. Let’s consider
these in briefly turn.
A. Distributed control
Control is the ability to exert influence over the parts of a
system. Traditionally, one looks for:
• A single point of remote control, or
• A single point of policy calibration.
In promise theory, control can only come from within an agent
as an autonomous decision to promise something; for instance,
a promise to provide a service +S, such as a function or
behaviour, or a promise to accept a service −S, like an Access
Control List promise.
Since an autonomous agent is free to ignore signals and
impositions from outside, remote control requires an explicit
promise by all agents to accept impositions from a single point
of command. This is fragile and it is a serial signalling regime.
A more efficient approach is to turn the signalling problem into
a parallel content-delivery problem by distributing pre-decided
policy that distributed agents can cache for self-correction.
Thus, Promise Theory suggests that a policy model is an
improvement in reliability, fault tolerance and scalability.
With a central controller approach, the central entity has
to make regular impositions on different parts of the system.
This adds complexity from outside the system and makes
the controller point location a bottleneck. A promise based
approach allows self-control based on a cached policy, without
further signalling. Thus it avoids to cost and resilience issues
of signalling infrastructure. Since policy is a set of pre-decided
promises with associated context which has potentially global
scope, it does not have to be communicated in real time, it can
be cached and replicated efficiently.
B. Resilience and fitness for purpose
Redundancy plays two roles: one in scaling, for parallel
throughput of data, and another in failover resilience (structural
plasticity) of agents [6]. Traditionally one thinks of:
• Single points of failure (unique fragile point).
• Single point of contact (redundancy allowed).
Redundancy means extending service resources inside a ser-
vice container in a fashion that is transparent to a client.
In promise theory, the generative rule is that no agent may
promise anything that is not about its own behaviour. Thus
resilience comes ‘from within’. Each agent promises its own
responsibilities within the whole. For +S promises each agent
can only do its best and presume additional support from others
it knows nothing about. For −S promises to consume a service
agents must say something like ‘I promise to use the service
S from either agent X or Y or Z’ (not just X). The promise
principle forces the responsibility for resilience back onto the
end-point, i.e. client or server, to the edges of the network. No
middle boxes like load balancers can improve the situation,
because no agent can influence their behaviour.
Fault tolerance can be understood as having clusters of
hosts working cooperatively as ‘super-agents’ to keep the
same forwarding promise. Each agent in a redundancy group
promises to cooperate with every other with mutual coopera-
tion promises Each agent promises to try to failover to other
agents; thus load balancing also becomes a client function
(without intermediaries). These promises are typically roles
by association [5] (e.g. by policy coordination) rather than
physical data links. The Clos networks are realizations of these,
in varying degrees of approximation [11].
This pattern can be applied both physically and logically
between any pair of roles: client/server, interface/switch, net-
work/router, etc. For a network, the intra-agent promises inside
each super-agent do not have to be physical connections,
but rather intentions to act symmetrically. Note however, the
architecture reported by Facebook to formalize this [12].
If the goal of containment is to reduce complexity, then
this architecture may be promised by a simple pattern. If
the promises made for communication are simple, then the
complexity of applications can also be eliminated without
abstraction, by employing simple stock patterns, like this or
like a lattice. For example using a simple configuration engine
to enforce the distributed pattern. Complex management inter-
faces with extensive programmability become unnecessary.
C. Network scalability
Scalability of networks is a complex issue that describes
how a system can support increased usage, component address-
ing, data throughput, without increased latency.
• Physical connectivity needs sufficient serial/parallel channel
capacity.
• Low latency and forwarding cost at routers, switches and
protocol transducers.
• Resilience: if something breaks there is a failover option.
• Human comprehensibility favors centralization.
These are all systemic promises of an architecture. They enable
emergent features of a network, and cannot be controlled from
any single point.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Promise Theory describes service-oriented functionality,
while avoiding imperative and centralized thinking. We use
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it here make neutral assessments of existing networking prin-
ciples, and lay bare the functional and emergent aspects.
We hope that, by summarizing networking in this manner,
the challenges and solutions appear plainer, and ultimately
tractable. This is an unusual viewpoint for Computer Science.
Rather than adopting the conventional belief that only that
which is programmed happens, it takes the opposite viewpoint:
“only that which is promised can be predicted”. It therefore
approaches management by embracing uncertainty—one might
say with realism rather than faith [6].
Some of the challenges we’ve addressed include:
• The role of trust in winning predictability rather than ‘con-
trol’.
• Communicating through meaningful abstractions in the con-
text of applications.
• Labelling and isolating resources used by different applica-
tion owners.
How one chooses to solve these is open for discussion.
The structure of promise theory suggests an approach based
more on decentralized abstraction. Bottom-up design favors
stability over functionality, but purpose drives change from
the top-down. Striking this balance is a task for new container
abstractions and simplifying patterns.
What we believe the network industry has done well in the
past is to build network infrastructure on a desired end-state
model with a low level of programmatic reasoning. There is
no programming needed to run OSPF or VLAN for instance,
only a few fixed data-driven promises. This limits complexity.
Where it has become deficient is in failing to deal with
promises that aid the running of applications, forcing business
users to confront irrelevant details.
Complexity is a major part of the challenge facing the
industry. To some extent this is a cognitive issue rather than
a fundamental limitation. How shall we deal with that? By
returning to “easy” ideas like centralization and brute force
that scale poorly we might be able to stave off dealing with
the issues, but at what cost to resilience and fault tolerance?
There are many topics we have not been able to cover in
this paper. A full analysis of current datacenter patterns in
relation to different kinds of application architectures, scales
and economies also seems overdue. Today we hear mainly
about the massive social media datacenters. While this might
be relevant for shared cloud services, there are still questions
to be answered about how best to scale physical networks for
different kinds of applications.
It would be interesting to compare and contrast the different
approaches developed by ourselves (the authors) in regard to
these challenges, and see how they could be sewn into a unified
view. How does IPv6 fare in the current picture, what about
MPLS and other technologies? How shall we identify fitness
for purpose without losing comprehensibility of networks?
Because of cloud patterns and the resource reusability
they enable, it has become common to say that datacenter
traffic patterns are changing from traditional “North-South” to
“East-West” due to the nature of compute virtualization. Many
authors have commented that one could learn from biological
systems in this regard [13], [14], because biology has clearly
evolved systems that embody the properties we find desirable
for building robust networks. Paul Baran foresaw an Internet
that was a lattice-like mesh [15] for resilience. However, the
Internet has a hierarchical structure [16] that is more fragile,
and we tend to favor tidy hierarchies over robust meshes.
Robustness might appear complex, but its underlying principles
are simple, and can be modelled in our promise-theory based
approach.
The challenges of scaling data communications are
amongst the most difficult we now face in IT. We believe that
these are crucial and exciting times, especially for network
innovation, as all aspects of infrastructure become key players
in the design of society’s critical information systems.
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